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Abstract
We model ﬁrms’ output decisions in a repeated duopoly frame-
work focusing on three interrelated issues: (1) the role of learning
in the adjustment process toward equilibrium, (2) the role of organi-
zational structure in the ﬁrm’s decision making, and (3) the role of
changing environmental conditions on learning and output decisions.
We characterize the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neural network, which
must estimate its optimal output decision based on signals it receives
from the economic environment (which inﬂuences the demand func-
tion). Via simulation analysis we show: (1) how organizations learn to
estimate the optimal output over time as a function of the environmen-
tal dynamics; (2) which networks are optimal for each environmental
complexity, and (3) the equilibrium industry structure.
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11 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to investigate the eﬀects of both environmental and
organizational factors on the outcome of repeated Cournot games. We model
the ﬁrm as an information processing network that is capable of learning a
data set of environmental variables. Standard models of the ﬁrm, in general,
tend to focus on the quantity strategy, while ignoring the fact that decisions
are made within an organizational framework. This is particularly true for
oligopolistic industries, which tend to be dominated by large ﬁrms employing
thousands of workers; furthermore, these ﬁrms are run by a large group of
managers that must agree on a strategy each period. These facts are often
neglected in models of oligopolistic interaction, even those that focus on
learning and dynamics.
Contrary to most models dealing with the dynamics of Cournot games,
we are not interested in modeling the learning of the optimal strategy per se,
but rather in the learning of the economic environment. More speciﬁcally,
we model ﬁrms of diﬀerent organizational structures competing, given that
they have to learn the eﬀect of changing environmental states on the demand
parameters. Using this approach, we are able to investigate the relationship
between optimal ﬁrm structure (in the sense of most proﬁcient at learning
the environmental characteristics) and the complexity of the environment
in which quantity competition takes place. Building on a previous paper
(Barr and Saraceno, 2002), we model the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neural
network (ANN), which must learn to make its optimal output decision based
on signals it receives from the economic environment (which inﬂuences the
demand function). The use of ANNs allows us to make explicit organizational
structure, and hence to include it in a model of ﬁrm competition.
We model the structure of the ﬁrm as the size of the network, given by
the number of processing units; we show in Barr and Saraceno (2002) that
ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between speed and accuracy. Smaller, more ﬂexible
ﬁrms learn faster, while larger ﬁrms are more accurate in the long run. In
addition, we show that the solution to the problem posed by this trade-oﬀ is
inﬂuenced by environmental characteristics, a position long held by manage-
ment scholars. The objective of the paper is therefore to understand if, and
how, this conclusion applies to the speciﬁc case of Cournot competitors fac-
ing (and having to learn) a changing demand curve, and how the complexity
of environment aﬀects optimal ﬁrm size.
The ﬁrst conclusion of the paper is that neural networks are capable of
2converging to the Nash equilibrium of a Cournot game. Over time, they
learn to perform the mapping between environmental characteristics and
optimal quantity decisions. This result is not surprising, as many adaptive
algorithms have been shown to have the same property. The second —also
expected— result is that proﬁtability (linked to the proﬁciency of network
learning) is inversely related to the complexity of the external environment
and to the error ﬁrms make in trying to learn the demand parameters.
These ﬁndings constitute the background for the main results of the pa-
per. First, given quantity competition between two ﬁrms, small ﬁrms/networks
reach relatively quickly a satisfactory knowledge of the function linking en-
vironmental factors and demand; on the other hand larger ﬁrms, initially
slower to learn, tend in the long run to outperform the small ones by be-
coming more accurate in their mapping. Related to this, we show that the
optimal ﬁrm size is increasing in the complexity of the environment itself;
in more complex environments the time necessary to learn the factors that
determine demand is longer, so the short run competitive edge of smaller
ﬁrms becomes progressively less relevant.
This result is robust, as it emerges both from a round-robin tournament
between networks of diﬀerent sizes, and from regression analysis on the sim-
ulation data, which shows how time, ﬁrm size, competitor’s ﬁrm size, and
environmental complexity aﬀect ﬁrm learning and hence performance. Fi-
nally, we show that an equilibrium industry conﬁguration (in which there is
no incentive to change ﬁrm size) may be found, and that it is also related to
the complexity of the environment.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section brieﬂyr e v i e w st h e
relevant literature, showing how we relate to (and depart from) the models on
learning in oligopoly games on the one hand, and to agent-based models on
the other. The following (section 3) introduces the repeated Cournot game,
describing the environment and our measure of environmental complexity.
Then, section 4 describes our model of the ﬁrm as a network of agents —a
type of neural network— and describes its application to the duopoly exam-
ple. Section 5 presents the results of the simulations and discusses the main
conclusions of the paper. Finally, in section 6 we conclude with suggestions
for further research and extensions.
32 Related Literature
Our work relates to two diﬀerent areas. The ﬁrst is the literature on Cournot
competition and its dynamics. Since at least the seminal paper by Cyert and
DeGroot (1973), the Cournot model has been widely studied by researchers
interested in learning and strategic interaction. Some of the works in this
area explore the conditions under which the duopolists will converge to the
Cournot equilibrium output (recent examples include Kopel, 1996; Chiarella
and Khomin, 1996; Puu, 1998; Bischi and Kopel, 2001). In these models
agents have to learn how to react to their opponents’ behavior. Given the
diﬀerent hypotheses (on demand characteristics, on externalities in the cost
function, and on expectation formation), the system may be described by
complex dynamics, that yield one or more equilibria; furthermore, initial
conditions usually determine whether convergence occurs, or chaotic dynam-
ics are engendered.
In a related approach, Vega-Redondo (1997), Vriend (2000) and Riech-
mann (2002) build on evolutionary game theory to investigate whether the
Cournot outcome is stable. The last two papers, in particular, show that con-
vergence to the Walrasian prices and quantities is more probable when social
(as opposed to individual) learning takes place, and agents are boundedly
rational. In these papers learning is in regards to the opponent’s strategy, or
the ﬁrm’s own inﬂuence on prices; information about the environment (i.e.,
the parameters of the demand function) is either complete or unnecessary
for learning to take place.
Two recent papers (Leonard and Nishimura, 1999; Bischi, Chiarella and
Kopel, 2002), on the other hand, investigate the case in which duopolists lack
knowledge of the demand function they face. If demand is misspeciﬁed, then
even best reply dynamics may converge to steady states (pseudo equilibria)
diﬀerent from the unique Nash-Cournot outcome. Nevertheless, in these
models there is no learning, as the misspeciﬁcation is not corrected along the
way.1
This paper merges the issues described above, as we address the issues
of learning and of misspeciﬁcation. We assume that demand depends on
environmental characteristics, in a way unknown to the agents. The ﬁrm
observes signals from the environment and based on these signals selects an
1Other papers (e.g., Verboven, 1997) search for conditions under which cooperation is
sustainable in repeated Cournot games. Our paper does not deal with this issue.
4output to produce. After observing its rival’s output and the true parameters,
it calculates what its output should have been, i.e., the best response. It
subsequently uses the error to improve its performance, i.e., the knowledge
of the relationship between observable environmental characteristics and the
demand parameters. In other words, rather than learning the best strategy,
ﬁrms have to learn the environment in which they operate. In this sense, as
will become clear in the following pages, strategic interaction and the best
response strategy remain in the background, entering the picture only as a
‘benchmark’ against which the ﬁrm evaluates its own performance.
As stated in the introduction, we seek to investigate how ﬁrm learning
interacts with organizational features. As a consequence, the second area
of the literature related to our work is that of agent-based models of the
ﬁrm (Radner, 1993; Carley, 1996; DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Li, 1999).
These models, borrowing heavily from computer science, represent the ﬁrm
as a network of information processing agents (nodes). In general these
papers study which types of networks minimize the costs of processing and
communicating information. Our model is also agent-based, as we assume
that output decisions are made by an information processing network.
However, our work is diﬀerent in two respects. In general, and unlike
other agent-based models, we directly model the relationship between the
external environmental variables, ﬁrm learning and performance; secondly,
we explicitly provide an agent-based model of Cournot competition, which,
to our knowledge, has not been done before. This paper is an attempt to
apply a standard economic problem (Cournot competition) to a network of
information processing agents to show how ﬁrms adapt to diﬀerent environ-
ments in order to perform at optimal levels.
Our agent-based approach models the ﬁrm as a type of artiﬁcial neu-
ral network. ANNs are common in computer science and psychology, where
they have been used for pattern recognition and modeling of the brain (Croall
and Mason; 1992; Skapura, 1996). In economics, neural networks have been
employed less frequently. One application —in econometrics— has been to
use ANNs as non-linear estimation equations (Kuan and White, 1992). In
game theory, Cho (1994) has tackled a prisoner’s dilemma game using a very
simple neural network (a perceptron) as a way to model bounded rational-
ity. Because of the stochastic and non-linear nature of ANNs we employ
a simulation-based approach to study the relationship between ﬁrm perfor-
mance, competition and size.
53 Cournot Competition with Stochastic De-
mand
Suppose we have two ﬁrms competing in quantities, facing the same linear,
downward-sloping demand curve, with the following proﬁtf u n c t i o n s :
πi =[ a − b(q1 + q2)]qi − ciqi i =1 ,2.
where qi is the output decision of each ﬁrm, ci ≥ 0 is marginal production
cost, and a,b > 0 are the demand parameters. Since we focus on performance,
and for simplicity, we assume that costs are zero, i.e., ci =0 .2
If the demand parameters were known we would have the standard sce-
nario: each ﬁrm tries to maximize its proﬁt, given the estimate of its rival’s
output, denoted Eiq−i. The ﬁrst order condition gives rise to a reaction func-












i is the best response output. If each player correctly assumes that
the rival will produce along its reaction function then the (Nash) equilibrium
















Textbook analysis tells us that with our linear speciﬁcation of the demand
function the two ﬁrms will converge to the Nash equilibrium even with
backward-looking expectation formation.
3.1 The Environment
In this paper we assume that the demand parameters are stochastic in the
sense that a and b are functions of environmental variables, which ﬂuctuate
according to a given probability law. For example, the intercept coeﬃcient
represents all those non-price elements that aﬀect demand, such as prefer-
ences, income, price of substitutes, etc.; the eﬀect of these variables on the
2Further, without any loss of generality, we assume that the ﬁrm bears no cost to
carrying the network. This assumption does not aﬀect the qualitative results of section 5.
6position of the demand curve may be only known partially ex-ante by the
ﬁrm; over time the organization has to learn how these factors indeed aﬀect
demand.
We assume that each parameter is a function of a vector of environmental
states (signals), which represent the characteristics of the environment; and
that each vector x (of length N) belongs to the set X of environmental data
vectors: xk∈ X,k=1 ...,v.3 We model these environmental variables as a
string of binary digits, a simple way to summarize the presence or absence of
features in the environment. We refer to the current vector (indexed by time,
t) xt∈ X as to the state of the environment,a n dt oX as the environment.
Each period, the state of the environment is determined by random draw
from the set X, where each element xk∈ X has a ﬁxed probability, pk, of
being selected (pk ≥ 0, and
Pv
k=1 pk =1 ) .
Equations (1) and (2) show the functional form for the intercept and slope












where αn,β n ∈ (0,1) ∀n are constants, and ca and cb are normalizing con-
stants so that the values of a and b are always between zero and one.4 This
characterization says for example that the nth bit for the slope has a marginal
contribution of nβn∆xn. By multiplying each bit by its index n we sort them
in order of importance, x1 being the element that contributes the least, and
xN being the most important. Notice furthermore that, though not necessary,
we assume this order of importance to be the same for a and b.
3X is a subset of the set of all binary digit vectors of length N (= 25), which has 2N
elements. In the simulations below, we pick ν (= 25) vectors by random draws. This data
set remains constant throughout all the simulations (generating alternative data sets does
not aﬀect the qualitative results presented in section 5).
4We add the square term on the intercept in order to increase the diﬃculty of the
learning problem, since our interest is creating a model where many agents are needed in
order to learn.
73.2 Complexity
In our model competition occurs in two areas: along the reaction curve (i.e.,
one ﬁrm’s increased output aﬀects, via the price, the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt) and
along the ’learning dimension.’ That is to say, the better and/or faster a ﬁrm
is able to estimate the demand parameters, the more it has a competitive
advantage, in the sense that it will have a relatively higher proﬁtc o m p a r e d
to its rival. We discuss this type of advantage in section 4.2.
Firms have to learn to recognize how environmental changes will aﬀect de-
mand and hence their optimal output. In other words, they have to learn how
to map the observed environmental vector x into the values of a and b. We de-
ﬁne the complexity of this pattern recognition problem as the entropy of the
probability distribution generating the environmental data points. Heuristi-
cally, we can think of entropy as a measure of the quantity of information
the ﬁrm is likely to process. If the distribution is concentrated on one or two
points, for example, then it is very likely to see those points most often; while
in a more uniform distribution the ﬁrm is more likely to see all the diﬀerent
states. In other words, entropy is a measure of ‘disorder,’ and as such we take
it as a measure of complexity. Given the probability distribution associated





Entropy ranges between 0 for a degenerate distribution and ln(v) for a uni-
form distribution.5
4 The Firm as a Network of Information Pro-
cessing Agents
In the previous section we argued that competition between ﬁrms occurs in
an unknown environment; ﬁrms must learn to map observed environmental
characteristics to unknown demand parameters. For this reason we view
the ﬁrm as an information processing algorithm. A sm e n t i o n e di ns e c t i o n2 ,
we model the ﬁrm as a network of information processing agents. In Barr
5In the simulations below complexity classes are generated by random draws. Since we
have pk > 0, ∀k the minimum entropy for our data set is strictly greater than zero.
8and Saraceno (2002) we highlight the features of ﬁrm behavior discussed
by management scholars (such as Galbraith, 1973 and Lawrence and Lorsch,
1986) that can be modeled by ANNs: ﬁrms/organizations process information
in a decentralized manner,b o t hserially and in parallel (i.e., information
within hierarchical levels is processed simultaneously, while it is processed
serially between levels). Organizations learn by experience and they learn to
generalize their experience to other related situations; this learning involves
both costs and beneﬁts, for which there is a optimal ﬁrm size. Further, the
knowledge of the ﬁrm does not reside in any one agent but rather resides
in the network of agents. Finally, ﬁrms are capable of adapting to their
environment.
We model the ﬁrm as a type of Backward Propagation Network (BPN)
(Skapura, 1996). A graphical representation of the network is shown in Figure
1. The network has three layers. The data (information) layer is comprised of
signals from the environment. As mentioned above, a particular data vector,
x, is a string of binary digits which represents whether features from the
environment are absent (0) or present (1). A ’hidden’ (management) layer is
comprised of several processing units (nodes), and the ’output’ (CEO) layer is
c o m p r i s e do fas i n g l e ,ﬁnal processing unit. Processing within a layer occurs
in parallel; processing between layers occurs serially. Each node performs
the same action: it takes a weighted sum of the inputs and then applies
a squashing (sigmoid) function which outputs values between 0 and 1 (i.e.,
large negative values are squashed to 0, large positive values are squashed to
1, and intermediate values are assigned a value close to 0.5).6
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Furthermore the network is capable of learning a data set, i.e., the eco-
nomic environment which aﬀects demand. Over successive iterations (es-
timations), as the network processes information, it improves its relative
performance, i.e., it learns to more accurately estimate the mapping between
environmental characteristics and demand parameters. As shown in Barr
and Saraceno (2002), ANNs highlight the trade-oﬀst oﬁrm learning: small
6A possible interpretation of the network is as a group of agents (managers) who assign
values to the environmental signals and pass these values up the hierarchy to a CEO,
who then takes an output decision based on these values. The CEO then observes the
true best-response output and communicates this information down the hierarchy to the
managers who use this information to improve their performance in the future periods.
9ﬁrms learn faster, but less precisely, while larger ﬁrms are slower to adapt
but are better able to learn a in complex environment.
4.1 The Network
Here we discuss the workings of the network in more detail. As we mentioned,
the environmental data (information) layer is a binary vector x ∈ X of length
N.E a c ho ft h eMi nodes (managers) in the hidden (management) layer takes
a weighted sum of the data from the data layer. That is, the jth agent in the
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where i =1 ,2,j=1 ,...,M i,n=1 ,...,N, and wh
ijn ∈ R (time subscripts
removed for notational convenience). Thus the set of ’inputs’ to the Mi agents
























Each agent then transforms the inputs via a sigmoid (voting) function to
produce an output, zh
ij = g(yh
ij)=1 /(1 + e
−yh
ij). The vector of processed
























The inputs to the output (CEO) layer is a weighted sum of all the outputs
























ij ∈ R. Finally, the output of the network —the estimate of the
quantity ˆ qi— is determined by transforming yo
i via the sigmoid function, ˆ qi =
g(yo
i). We summarize the data processing (‘feed-forward’) phase of a network
with one hidden layer as7













≡ NNi (x). (3)
7We focus on a one hidden layer network to simplify the computation and to reduce
the number of organizational variables. Increasing complexity (size) of the ﬁrm might also
be modeled by adding hidden layers rather than (or in addition to) nodes. The use of
additional layers would be justiﬁed only if we had a very complex learning problem, which
is not the case for our simple model.
10Notice that the expected value of the opponent’s quantity decision doesn’t
directly enter into equation (3) (that is, we don’t have ˆ qit = NN(xt,Eˆ q−it)).
In fact, if this expectation were adaptive (i.e., it included past observations
of q−i) then it would be unwarranted since the state of the environment
changes from period to period, making past quantity decisions moot. If the
expectation were not adaptive, it would have to be based on the information
available to the ﬁrm, i.e., x. This would bring us back to equation (3).
Also notice that the lack of direct strategic interaction does not imply that
the two ﬁrms do not inﬂuence each other. In fact, the competitor’s choice
enters into the best response ‘ideal’ quantity of the ﬁrm, and consequently
aﬀects the weight update process described in section 4.3 below. In this
framework, ﬁrm −i0s actions aﬀects ﬁrm i0s payoﬀs, rather than ﬁrm i0s
actions. In addition, ﬁrms will be able to learn as long as the behavior of the
rival is not too erratic, though the rate of learning will be aﬀected.8
In the next section we will show that the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt by mini-
mizing the error it makes in choosing a quantity to produce; then, in section
4.3 we’ll describe how learning takes place.
4.2 Learning and Proﬁtability
Each period ﬁrms observe an environmental state vector, x, and produce an
output given by:
ˆ qi = NNi (x),i =1 ,2
Given the output choices of the ﬁrms, the proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o rﬁrm i is given
by
πi =[ a − b(ˆ q1 +ˆ q2)] ˆ qi.
Each ﬁrm then compares its output choice to the (optimal) quantity that
it would have chosen if it produced along its reaction curve, given its ri-













8We ran some tests, and the results show that only in extreme cases, when the com-
petitor, for example, chooses a random quantity with very high variance, the ﬁrm may be
unable to learn the mapping from environmental characteristics to demand parameters.
11Given the rival’s choice of output, ˆ q−i, the highest proﬁt ﬁrm i could have
achieved if it produced its optimal output, qbr























































i − ˆ qi
¢2
. (4)






i − ˆ qi
¢2
, (5)
and per-period proﬁto fﬁrm i can be given by
πi = π
br
i − Li = π
br
i − bξi.
Since ﬁrm i0s proﬁt is maximized when ξi =0 , the ﬁrm attempts to
minimize ξi over time, which it does via the learning algorithm procedure
described in the next section.
4.3 The Learning Algorithm
In section 4.1, we described how ﬁrms choose a quantity, ˆ qi, g i v e na no b -
served state of the environment. Over time, however, ﬁrms improve their
performance as they learn to map diﬀerent states to the correct demand pa-
rameters. Each period ˆ qi is compared to the ideal output i.e., the output
along the reaction function and the error is calculated using equation (5).
This information is then propagated backwards as the weights are adjusted
according to the learning algorithm, which aims to minimize the squared
error, ξi.
Recall that for the sigmoid function g0 (yo
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The weights are then adjusted a small amount in the opposite (negative)
direction of the gradient. A constant, η, is the learning-rate parameter which

































ij. When the updating of weights is ﬁnished, the
ﬁrm views the next input pattern and repeats the weight-update process.9
5 Learning and Cournot Competition: A Sim-
ulation Experiment10
As a summary, let us review the estimation and learning steps for a given
entropy value:
1. The ﬁrm i =1 ,2 observes the state of the environment xt ∈ X.










9We begin with a completely untrained network by selecting random weight values (i.e.,
we assume the network begins with no prior knowledge of the environment).
10The simulations in the section were performed in Mathematica 3 . 0 .T h ec o d ei sa v a i l -
able upon request.
133. It then observes the true parameters and calculates the optimal quan-





b(xt) − ˆ q−it
i
.11
4. The diﬀerence between ˆ qit and the best response qbr
it serves as basis for
the weight update process: ξit =
¡
qbr
it − ˆ qit
¢2 . Using this error, the ﬁrm
updates its weights to improve its performance in the next round.
5. The price determined by the market is pt =[ a−b(ˆ q1t+ˆ q2t)], and based
on that we calculate actual proﬁt. Proﬁt and the error are recorded at
each t. The steps are repeated again, until we reach t = T.
We ran each of the experiments described below 50 times and took aver-
ages in order to smooth ﬂuctuations due to the random initial weights value.
5.1 Experiment #1: Learning Optimal Quantity
This section shows that networks converge to the optimal quantity. The
weight update process allows the network to make a correct mapping between
environmental characteristics and optimal quantity. To keep things simple,
for the moment we consider two ﬁrms of equal size.12
Figure 2 shows how ﬁrm 1 converges to the optimal quantity. The curves
represent the ratio of proﬁt to the optimal value (π1,t/π∗
t), and the diﬀerence
between quantity and optimal quantity (|q1t−q∗
t|). Convergence implies that
the ﬁrst curve goes to one, whereas the second converges to zero. This is in




[Insert Figure 2 here]
The second goal of this section is to show that increasing complexity of the
environment has, in general, the eﬀect of reducing the network performance.
11With a linear demand function, ﬁrms have to observe two pairs of (p,q1 + q2)t o
determine the true parameters a and b (and to compute the best response). Hence, we
implicitly assume that for each draw of the environmental vector ﬁrms play at least twice,
i.e,. that the environment remains constant suﬃc i e n t l yl o n g .S i n c ew ef oc u so nt h el e a r n i n g
of the mapping from x to the parameters, and within each iteration no new information
is provided, these ‘subperiods’ can be neglected in the analysis.
12In particular, M1 = M2 =8 . In this initial experiment the choice of network size is
not crucial. In general, networks of diﬀerent sizes will converge at diﬀerent speeds, but
none will fail to learn the optimal quantity.
14Figure 3 plots the average proﬁto v e rt h eT = 200 iterations, against the
entropy value used for that particular run. As is expected, the average π/π∗
drops for increasing complexity; we also plot the deviation from optimal
quantity, which increases with entropy.13
[Insert Figure 3 here]
In this section we showed that networks are able to learn the optimal
strategy in a Cournot setting, and that this learning is easier the simpler is the
environment they face. Given these general features of our framework, we’ll
turn to the main topic of this paper: the relative performance of networks
of diﬀerent organizational structures competing in environments of varying
complexity.
5.2 Experiment #2: Optimal Network Size
Tournament
This section investigates the performance of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes com-
peting against each other. We designed the experiment as a round robin
between networks with 2 to 15 nodes in the hidden layer, so that we had ¡14
2
¢
= 91 games. We divided the environment in two diﬀerent levels of com-
plexity, depending on the entropy value: simple environments have an en-
tropy going from 1.4t o1 .9, whereas complex ones have an entropy going
from 2.7t o3 .2.14 We had 50 draws of entropy values within each class (sim-
ple/complex), and we recorded the average proﬁta n de r r o rf o rt h et w oﬁrms
over the T = 200 iterations. The total score of each network is the sum of
the average proﬁts obtained against all the other opponents.15
The results are reported in ﬁgure 4. The winners in the simple envi-
ronment tournament are networks of size 3; whereas in the complex case the
highest scoring networks have 7 nodes. Furthermore, looking at the extremes,
we see that small networks perform quite well in the simple environment
whereas the larger ones are relatively more eﬀective in the complex envi-
ronment. Finally, notice that proﬁts in the simple environment have higher
13In the early stages of the process proﬁts may be negative. We overlook this issue by
assuming that ﬁrms have enough internal funds to cover initial losses.
14These values are obtained by dividing the total range of E in three intervals of equal
length, and discarding (for this section) the middle one.
15This measure, which avoids the distortions linked to measures of relative proﬁt, was
suggested by Nicolaas Vriend.
15mean and standard error (0.311 and 0.0048 respectively, against 0.199 and
0.0042 for the complex environment).
[Insert Figure 4 here]
To summarize, the tournament tells us that computational power may be
a disadvantage when the environment is simple. In this case smaller ﬁrms,
which converge more rapidly, and have an overall better performance. Since
this velocity is paid in terms of lower accuracy, in complex environments the
proﬁtability is reversed, and the higher accuracy of large ﬁrms is rewarded,
compensating for slower convergence.
Regression Analysis
The results of the tournament are conﬁrmed by another experiment we
ran. We made 2000 random draws of the parameters E ∈ [1.4,3.2],M 1,M 2 ∈
[2,15], and T ∈ [30,300]. We then made the two networks compete, and
recorded the average proﬁts and squared errors over each run. Finally, we
ran a regression using as the dependent variable average proﬁts. Table 1
reports the results for ﬁrm one (given the symmetry, results for ﬁrm two are
analogous).
Notice that, over the relevant range, entropy and the number of iterations
have the expected signs. Namely, an increasing complexity (higher E)y i e l d s
lower average proﬁt; and an increase in the number of runs T gives to the
ﬁrms more time to learn, causing lower average error and higher average
proﬁt, all else equal. A more interesting relationship exists between the
number of nodes and our measures of ﬁrm performance. Figure 5 plots the
proﬁto fﬁrm one using the coeﬃcients of the relevant variables, M1 and M2.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
The ﬁgure shows that ﬁrm one’s proﬁt is increasing in the other ﬁrm’s
dimension, even if at a decreasing rate. We will come back to this relationship
when discussing optimal size in experiment #3.
The relationship with the ﬁrm’s own dimension is not as clear from the
picture, but it suggests the hump-shape relationship we highlighted before.
We therefore investigated the relationship between a ﬁrm’s size and complex-
ity. Figure 6 shows how proﬁts depend on ﬁrm one’s size and entropy, both in
the relevant ranges. It shows that proﬁt is decreasing in complexity, whereas




Variable Coeﬃcient t-stat Variable Coeﬃcient t-stat
const 111.02 34.7 M2 8.37 30.8
E 5.71 2.6 M2
2 −0.356 −12.3
E2 −2.59 −6.0 M3
2 0.00794 7.5
T 1.52 41.1 M1 · M2 −0.0986 −8.5
T 2 −0.01 −26.1 (M1 · M2)2 0.000138 4.0
T 3 0.0000337 20.0 (E · M1)2 −0.00445 −11.6
T 4 −0.00000004 −16.7 T · M1 0.00223 3.4
M1 1.307 4.8 T · M2 −0.0203 −30.5
M2





Table 1: Regression of proﬁts over E, T, M1 and M2, including powers and
cross terms. All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 104 to make the table more
readable. Non signiﬁcant variables were omitted.
This explains why in the previous ﬁgure, when entropy was held constant,
the relationship was less visible.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
To sum up, the regression results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the tournament,
and add new insights. Increasing complexity, and shorter time to learn,
negatively aﬀect proﬁts, whereas the hump-shape relationship between own
size and proﬁtability is more evident at higher complexity levels. We also
found that proﬁts are linked (positively) to the opponent’s dimension, an
issue that we’ll tackle next.
5.3 Experiment #3: Firm Size Equilibria
As discussed above, ﬁrms learn to produce at the Nash equilibrium output
level over time. Here, however, we explore the concept of equilibrium with
regards to network size, which we call a network size equilibrium (NSE).
We deﬁne an NSE as a pair of M0s such that neither ﬁrm has an incentive
to change the number of managers. That is to say, in an equilibrium, each
17network, given the number of agents (nodes) of its rival, ﬁnds that switch-
ing to another number of agents will decrease its average proﬁt. Thus, the

























We ask the questions: does (at least one) NSE exist for each entropy? And
what is the relationship between complexity and the equilibrium size net-
works? We focus on the equilibria that exist after T periods, and do not
have endogenous dynamics with the number of managers Mi, i.e., we do not
examine ﬁrms changing the number of managers during the learning process.
Rather we conduct a kind of comparative statics exercise, whereby we look
at the NSE that arise for given environmental conditions.
In this experiment, we have networks of diﬀerent sizes compete for T =
200 iterations (for each pair of M0s and entropy value we take 50 runs and
take averages to smooth out ﬂuctuations in each run). That is to say, ﬁrm
one and two compete against each other for each size, M1,M 2 ∈ {2,...,15}.
We repeat this competition for several diﬀerent entropy levels. We then look
to see, for each entropy value, if one (or more) NSE exist.
As an example, ﬁgure 7 shows the proﬁts of the two ﬁrms, when holding
constant ﬁrm two’s network size at six nodes, and increasing the size of ﬁrm
one. We see that ﬁrm one’s optimal size given ﬁr mt w o ’ ss i z e( s i xn o d e s )i sa t
ﬁve nodes. We also see that after that value, there is a negative relationship
between ﬁrm one and two’s proﬁts. As we increase ﬁrm one’s nodes above
a certain value, it achieves a tremendous competitive disadvantage vis a vis
ﬁrm two because its network is much larger and slower in converging to the
correct weight values.
[Insert Figure 7 here]
In the following graph we present the results of the simulation. We gener-
ated 30 diﬀerent entropy values. For each of them we calculated the NSE and
then added the total number of managers to obtain an ‘equilibrium industry
size.’ This gave us a data set of 62 NSE’s and industry sizes, for which there
was at least one equilibrium.
18We grouped each of the NSE’s into three entropy/complexity categories:
simple, medium and complex, where the ranges are the same as in section
5.2. We then took the average industry size for each category. Figure 8 shows
the results. As we can see average industry size is increasing in complexity.
This concords with the ﬁndings discussed in experiment #1 and #2.
[Insert Figure 8 here]
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper oﬀers some insights on the interaction between the competition
in an oligopolistic market and learning performance linked to organizational
structure and environmental complexity. In general, we showed that neural
networks as models of the ﬁrm are able to converge to the unique Nash
equilibrium of a Cournot game when facing a linear demand function with
stochastic parameters.
We also showed that the optimal organizational structure is not constant,
but changes with the environment. The trade-oﬀ, that we investigated in
more general terms in a previous paper, appears in a Cournot setting as
well: speed and accuracy are inversely related, and which factor is more
proﬁtable depends on, in general, the complexity of the environment. This
result emerges from diﬀerent types of experiment: a round robin tournament,
a regression analysis, and an investigation of the equilibrium structure of the
industry.
A number of open questions remain for further investigation in future
research. One is whether this structure can give us insights on the incentives
for collusive behavior, and on their relationship with the environment. We
could, for example, investigate the relationship between environmental com-
plexity, ﬁrm complexity and cooperative behavior. This structure could also
be useful to investigate quantity output equilibrium selection (a case that
did not concern us here, given that we dealt with linear demand, and con-
sequently with a unique equilibrium). Finally we could explore the general
analytical properties of ANNs as they relate to economic phenomena, such
as those explored here.
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Figure 2: Convergence to Cournot Nash Equilibrium for one of the two
competitors. Ratio of proﬁt to optimal value (π1t/π∗
t), and absolute value of
the diﬀerence between quantity and optimal quantity (|q1t − q∗
t|).T= 200
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Figure 3: Complexity and network performance. Average proﬁtr a t i o ,
T −1 P
t(π1t/π∗


























Figure 4: Round Robin Tournament. Scores for simple and complex environ-
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Figure 5: Average proﬁto fﬁrm 1 as a function of size of the two ﬁrms:
104 · ¯ π1 = 111 + 1.3M1 − 0.13M2
1 +0 .003M3
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Figure 6: Average proﬁto fﬁrm 1 as a function of own size and entropy:
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Figure 8: Average industry size (M1 + M2) vs. environmental complexity
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